EU External Representation in Conflict Resolution: When does the Presidency or the High Representative Speak for Europe?

Paper prepared for the ECPR Conference in Potsdam, Germany, 10-12 September 2009

Who speaks for Europe is a major question in European integration, yet few systematic attempts have been made to study when the Presidency or the High Representative represents the collectivity. This article shows that the size of the Presidency matters by means of two most-similar cases of conflict resolution. Large member states have more diplomatic resources and political experience. They are therefore less inclined to rely on the High Representative and his staff. The High Representative, on the other hand, has greater difficulty to compete with large member states for media attention and for third party recognition.

Theorizing the Role of the European Commission in the Common Foreign and Security Policy

Paper prepared for the UACES Conference in Angers, France, 3-5 September 2009

This article analyses why the EU member states have delegated tasks to the European Commission in the sensitive fields of foreign and security policy. While various publications give a descriptive account of the role of the Commission in foreign policy, few relate such observations to European integration theory. This article outlines competing rationalist and constructivist explanations for delegation and it subsequently studies the rationale of member states during the most important historical instances of (non-)delegation. From these findings, it concludes that member states delegated particular tasks to the Commission out of a functional need to bridge the divide between between economic integration and foreign policy coordination. There was a clear need for consistency and the European Commission was, due to its expertise of the internal market and knowledge of the acquis communautaire, best placed to provide it. As a result, the Commission is particularly active in the so-called cross-pillar dossiers.

Explaining Variation in the Role of the EU Council Secretariat in First and Second Pillar Policy-Making

Accepted for the Journal of European Public Policy

Commission Versus Council Secretariat: An Analysis of Bureaucratic Rivalry in European Foreign Policy

European Foreign Affairs Review, 2009

The European Commission and the EU Council Secretariat support the Member States in the conduct of European foreign policy, yet they have not always been able to get along. This article gives an overview of their inter-institutional relations across history, foreign policy instruments (declarations, crisis management joint actions and representation) and regions. The main argument is that the relationship between both institutions is generally cooperative, but that tensions do arise in a limited number of cases where the roles of the Commission and the Council Secretariat are unclear, perceived to overlap or in competition. In these instances, they have generally found a modus vivendi and their inter-institutional relations have subsequently improved. Such informal arrangements do not address, however, the underlying structural problems – that the Council Secretariat challenges the Commission’s political and informational role in the context of foreign policy. Differences between both institutions are therefore still regularly displayed. This continues to undermine EU consistency and its effectiveness in international relations.

The Council Secretariat's Role in the Common Foreign and Security Policy

European Foreign Affairs Review, 2008

The Council Secretariat, under the leadership of Javier Solana, has become an indispensable actor in the context of the CFSP. This article gives a comprehensive overview of this institution's development path since the beginning of European Political Cooperation (1970). It argues that with the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty and the parallel Cologne European Council (both 1999), the Secretariat received at once a political and a military dimension. This has been the basis for a significant expansion during the last decade. From a wider perspective it shows that the Council Secretariat fills the political absence of the European Commission in the field of the CFSP. The Council Secretariat is basically strong in areas where the Commission is weak. These inter-institutional dynamics are important with a view to the Lisbon Treaty, which will see a partial merger of the CFSP services in both institutions. Lastly this article argues on a theoretical level that while these developments are significant, the rationale behind the Council Secretariat is different from the role of the Commission in the first pillar and this limits its potential.